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LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF "DUTIES TO ONESELF":
KANT v. NEO-KANTIANS
.M. Finnis*
I.
My duty towards myself cannot be treated juridically; the law
touches only our relations with other men; I have no legal ob-
ligations towards myself; and whatever I do to myself I do to a
consenting party .... I
So Kant's students understood him to say in his lectures on ethics in
1780-81. At about the same time, the Critique of Pure Reason proclaimed
that legislation should be guided by the Idea of "a constitution allowing
the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws by which the
freedom of each is made to be consistent with that of all others."2 And there are
sentences in his own later writings which might seem to confirm the
apparent meaning and interrelation of those assertions. For example:
[The concept of Right] [er Begiffdes Rechts] ... applies only to
the external and-what is more-practical relationship of one
person to another in which their actions can in fact exert an
influence on each other (directly or indirectly).3
If, therefore, my action or my condition in general can co-
exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a uni-
versal law, then anyone who hinders me in performing the ac-
tion or in maintaining the condition does me an injustice .... 4
Passages such as these may seem to ally Kant with those among our
contemporaries who are willing or even keen to label Kantian their
political theory that (i) the state (government, the law) should be neu-
tral amongst competing conceptions of what is good or right for indi-
viduals (the neutrality principle), and/or (ii) the state has no right to use
coercion directly or indirectly to discourage conduct not harmful to
persons other than those who consent to engage in it (the harm
principle).
If Kant did consider that his ethical and legal theory required, or
was consistent with, either the neutrality principle or the harm princi-
* Fellow, University College, Oxford University.
1. I. Kant, Duties to Oneself, in Lectures on Ethics 117 (L. Infield trans. 1978
[1930]).
2. I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason *A316/B373 (N. Smith trans. 1965 [1933])
[hereinafter Critique of Pure Reason] (emphasis in original).
3. I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice *230 (Rechtslehre) (J. Ladd trans.
1965) [hereinafter Metaphysical Elements of Justice]. Ladd reads Recht here as "jus-
tice," which is not necessarily a sheer mistake. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
4. Id.; see also id. at *237 (on the right to "innate equality, that is, independence
from being bound by others to do more than one can also reciprocally bind them to
do").
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pie, that would be ground to doubt his theory. For our contemporar-
ies' efforts to defend one or other, or both, of those two principles are
notably unsuccessful. In Part II of this Paper, I examine the attempts of
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin; in Part III, I examine an attempt by
D.A.J. Richards, who more explicitly claims the patronage of Kant's
general theory of freedom and autonomy.
As the critique of Richards' theses will suggest, however, Kant's
critical writings adhere neither to the neutrality nor to the harm princi-
ple. Rather, as I argue in Part IV, they repudiate those principles.
(One who, like Kant, rejects the harm principle will reject the neutrality
principle, though many who reject the neutrality principle uphold the
harm principle.) Kant seems to me broadly correct in many of his prac-
tical conclusions, 5 but his defense of them is weakened, as I argue in
Part V, by well-known structural weaknesses in his ethical theory.
II.
Rawls does not argue for the neutrality principle and the harm
principle as such, but for a principle which, so far as its content can be
specified at all,6 seems almost identical in its force and practical impli-
cations: that "everyone should have the greatest equal liberty consis-
tent with a similar liberty for others. ' 7 "[J]ustice as fairness requires
us to show that modes of conduct interfere with the basic liberties of
others or else violate some obligation or natural duty before they can
be restricted."
What, then, are Rawls' arguments against the rival view, which he
calls "perfectionist"? This is the view that the state has the responsibil-
ity and right to foster the good, the well-being, flourishing, and excel-
lence, of all its citizens and to discourage them, even coercively, from at
least some of the actions and dispositions which would injure, degrade,
or despoil them, even some actions and dispositions which as such are
"self-regarding." Rawls expressly admits that:
[T]he freedom and well-being of individuals, when measured
by the excellence of their activities and works, is vastly differ-
ent in value .... Comparisons of intrinsic value can obviously
be made; and... judgments of value have an important place
5. But not all-not, e.g., his condonation of infanticide of illegitimate children. Id.
at *336. Still, pace Richards, this paper is not concerned to discuss which of Kant's prac-
tical conclusions are sound, and which unsound.
6. For serious doubts raised about the intelligibility and specifiability of this "prin-
ciple" see H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 534-55
(1973), reprinted in Reading Rawls 230-52 (N. Daniels ed. 1975).
7. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice 327-28 (1971); cf. Kant's sentence quoted supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
8. J. Rawls, supra note 7, at 331. In Rawls' terminology, all obligations are obliga-
tions of fairness and all natural duties are duties owed to others. Id. at 112, 115. On the
interpretation of this passage, see H.L.A. Hart, supra note 6, at 541-42, reprinted in
Reading Rawls, supra note 6, at 238.
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in human affairs. They are not necessarily so vague that they
must fail as a workable basis for assigning rights.9
Having conceded this, he offers two arguments against perfectionism.
The first, and primary, is that perfectionist principles would not be cho-
sen in the Original Position, in which principles to regulate social life in
a well-ordered society are chosen by persons ignorant of what will be
their own personal interests, beliefs, and highest ends. And perfection-
ist principles would not be chosen because:
To acknowledge any such standard would be, in effect, to ac-
cept a principle that might lead to a lesser religious or other
liberty .... They [persons in the Original Position] cannot risk
theirfreedom by authorizing a standard of value to define what is
to be maximized by a teleological principle of justice.10
For:
They cannot take chances with their liberty by permitting the dom-
inant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress
others if it wishes.... [T]o gamble in this way would show that
one did not take one's religious or moral convictions seriously
11
The supporting consideration advanced in the sentence last quoted
suggests the fragility of the whole argument. For, in times when certain
religious and moral convictions precisely were taken with great serious-
ness, rational people were indeed willing to admit the perfectionist
principle and thereby "gamble" that the right (from their own point of
view) religious and moral beliefs would be enforced. When beliefs
wrong from their point of view were enforced, they did not complain
that that was unfair in principle-but only that it was unjust in fact,
because the beliefs were erroneous-and they sought whatever means
of resistance or reform promised an opportunity to enforce correct
ones. So: Rawls' argument must do without its final supporting
flourish.
And without that flourish it fares badly. Its premise is simply that,
for reasons of sheer prudent self-interest (quite independent of moral-
ity or fairness), perfectionism would not be chosen in the Original Posi-
tion. Its conclusion is that perfectionism is not a just principle. The
non sequitur is obvious enough. (But it centrally flaws Rawls' entire
construction in A Theory ofJustice.) The conditions of the Original Posi-
tion do secure that the principles which would be chosen in it would be
fair, inasmuch as those conditions systematically exclude the sources of
inter-personal bias (favoritism) and thus guarantee impartiality.' 2 But
9. J. Rawls, supra note 7, at 328.
10. Id. at 327-28 (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 207 (emphasis added).
12. But the Rawlsian construction does not escape bias as between conceptions of
the good and thus also as between conceptions of the person. SeeJ. Raz, The Morality of
Freedom 117-33 (1986); Nagel, Rawls on Justice, in Reading Rawls, supra note 6, at
8-10.
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nothing in logic or in Rawls' argument, anywhere in the book, entitles
him to conclude that a principle which would not be chosen in the Orig-
inal Position cannot be a principle of justice in the real world.
Perfectionist principles were rejected by Rawls, not as unfair, but
as inimical to the self-interest of anyone whose views or desires might
conflict with some application of those principles-and to that self-in-
terest as conceived in ignorance of moral principles and other standards of excel-
lence. Rawls' argument is thus helpless against claims that applying
"perfectionist" principle(s) will be in the best interests, truly conceived,
of everyone, even of those who have to be coercively prevented fru'a
damaging their own best interests.
Here, then, we come to Rawls' second argument, extractable from
an uneasily shifting paragraph which begins by conceding that it is in-
deed not easy to argue against moderate perfectionism. "Moderate
perfectionism" relies not on a single conception of the good life, to
secure which all other lives must be subordinated, but on claims about
the excellent and the degrading which are balanced "intuitionistically"
against liberty and equality. Rawls' uneasy argument asserts first that
"criteria of excellence are imprecise as political principles," and that
"their application to public questions is bound to be unsettled and idio-
syncratic."' 13 It then shifts abruptly to an assertion even more obvi-
ously questionable and contingent: that appeals to perfectionist
criteria are made "in an ad hoc manner," and made because other crite-
ria of political choice, consistent with (in effect) the harm principle, fail
to justify proposed restrictions on conduct. But this assertion is in turn
immediately qualified; it is not always but only "often" or "likely"
true. 14 His conclusion is appropriately weak: "[I]t seems best to rely
entirely on the [i.e., his] principles ofjustice which have a more definite
structure." 15
But plainly it will "seem best" only to those who are content with
the peculiar "modern conditions" of chaotic disagreement about good
and evil; these are the conditions for which, alone, Rawls seeks to iden-
tify principles ofjustice.16 Manifestly, the whole argument, even if ac-
13. J. Rawls, supra note 7, at 330.
14. Id. at 331.
15. Id.
16. See Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77J. Phil. 515, 518 (1980)
[hereinafter Rawls, Kantian Constructivism] ("[W]e are not trying to find a conception
ofjustice suitable for all societies regardless of their particular social or historical cir-
cumstances. We want to settle a fundamental disagreement over the just form of basic
institutions within a democratic society under modem conditions."); id. at 539
("(J]ustice as fairness assumes that deep and pervasive differences of religious, philo-
sophical, and ethical doctrine remain."); Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Meta-
physical, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 223, 225, 230-31 (1985) [hereinafter Rawls, Justice as
Fairness]. Note Rawls' conclusion in Kantian Constructivism: "[Flor all that I have said
it is still open to the rational intuitionist to reply that I have not shown that rational
intuitionism is false or that it is not a possible basis for the necessary agreement in our
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cepted, is quite incapable of showing that it is always unjust to use state
power in violation of the neutrality and harm principles.
Efforts, then, have been made to supply what Rawls so clearly
failed to supply: an argument that the neutrality principle and/or the
harm principle are principles required by justice. Ronald Dworkin's
well-known effort was in fact, I think, first advanced as a fundamental
reinterpretation of Rawls' basic construction:
The original position.., as a device for testing ... competing
arguments . . . supposes, reasonably, that political arrange-
ments that do not display equal concern and respect are those
that are established and administered by powerful men and
women who, whether they recognize it or not, have more con-
cern and respect for members of a particular class, or people
with particular talents or ideals, than they have for others. 17
As Dworkin later said, on his own behalf: "Government must not only
treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern and re-
spect.... It must not constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's
conception of the good life of one group is nobler or superior to an-
other's."' 8 I shall not delay on this claim that legislative protection of
morals manifests official or majority contempt for those whose pre-
ferred conduct is proscribed or impeded. I think Dworkin has tacitly
conceded its untenability. Briefly: it fails because such legislation may
manifest, not contempt, but rather a sense of the equal worth and
human dignity of those people whose conduct is outlawed precisely on
the ground that it expresses a serious misconception of, and actually
degrades, human worth and dignity, and thus degrades their own per-
sonal worth and dignity, along with that of others who may be induced
to share in or emulate their degradation.' 9 To judge persons mistaken,
and to act on that judgment, is not to be equated, in any field of human
discourse or practice, with despising those persons or preferring
oneself.
So Dworkin has now offered a revised version of his argument.
The new version relies instead on the idea of a hypothetical loss of, or
judgments of justice. It has been my intention to describe constructivism by contrast
and not to defend it, much less to argue that rational intuitionism is mistaken." Rawls,
Kantian Constructivism, supra, at 570.
17. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 181 (1977) (emphasis added). Dworkin
continues:
Men who have no idea of their own conception of the good cannot act to favor
those who hold one ideal over those who hold another. The original position is
well designed to enforce the abstract right to equal concern and respect, which
must be understood to be the fundamental concept of Rawls' deep theory.
Id. For Rawls' tempered denial of this, see Rawls, Justice as Fairness, supra note 16, at
236 n.19. Dworkin later ascribed a similar view toJ.S. Mill. See R. Dworkin, supra, at
263.
18. R. Dworkin, supra note 17, at 272-73.
19. For another way of showing that the claim is untenable, see J. Finnis, Natural
Law and Natural Rights 221-23 (1980).
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incompatibility with, self-respect (one's own sense of one's equal
worth):
[L]iberalism based on equality... insists that government...
must impose no sacrifice or constraint on any citizen in virtue
of an argument that the citizen could not accept without aban-
doning his sense of his equal worth .... [N]o self-respecting
person who believes that a particular way to live is most valua-
ble for him can accept that this way of life is base or degrad-
ing. . . . So liberalism as based on equality justifies the
traditional liberal principle that government should not en-
force private morality .... 20
But this argument is as impotent as its forerunners. To forbid people's
preferred conduct does not require them to "accept an argument."
And if they did accept the argument on which the law is based, they
would be accepting that their former preferences were indeed unwor-
thy of them (or, if they had always recognized that, but had retained
their preferences nonetheless, it would amount to an acknowledgment
that they had been unconscientious). The phenomenon of conversion
or, less dramatically, of regret and reform, shows that one must not
identify persons (and their worth as human beings) with their current
conception(s) of human good. In sum: either those whose preferred
conduct is legally proscribed come to accept the concept of human
worth on which the law is based, or they do not. If they do, there is no
injury to their self-respect; they realize that they were in error, and may
be glad of the assistance which compulsion lent to reform. (Does this
sound unreal? Think of drug addicts.) And if they do not come to ac-
cept the law's view, the law leaves their self-respect unaffected; they will
regard the law, rightly or wrongly, as pitiably (and damagingly) mis-
taken in its conception of what is good for them. They may profoundly
resent the law. What they cannot accurately think is that the law does
not treat them as an equal; for the justifying concern of this law, as an
effort to uphold morality, is (we can here suppose) a concern for the
good, the worth and the dignity of everyone without exception. 21
III.
Before turning directly to Kant's own account of these matters, it
20. R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 205-06 (1985).
21. Sometimes Dworkin distinguishes between the worth of people and the worth
of their preferences. See, e.g., R. Dworkin, supra note 20, at 360. Usually, however, he
thinks that (to use the old jargon) to condemn the sin is to manifest contempt for the
sinner-a mistake encouraged by his ambiguous phrase "people of bad character." Id.
at 357. He thus overlooks one of the important aspects of what I have called "trans-
parency." SeeJ. Finnis, Fundamentals of Ethics 70-74, 140-42 (1983). What is trans-
parent for me, viz. the quality of my choices for the quality of my character, is not
transparent when I am making judgments about other people, their choices and their
character. Since I do not know the deepest grounds of their choices, I can condemn
those choices without condemning (the character of) those who made them. Id.
[Vol. 87:433
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will be helpful to observe the use to which certain words taken from
that account are put by a current defender of the neutrality and harm
principles, David Richards. Richards offers to derive principles of pub-
lic and constitutional morality from a concept of human rights expli-
cated "in terms of an autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals":
2 2
Crucially, the idea of "human rights" respects this capacity of
persons for 23 rational autonomy-their capacity to be, in
Kant's memorable phrase, free and rational sovereigns in the
kingdom of ends [citation to Grundlegung *433-34]. Kant char-
acterized this ultimate normative respect for 2 4 the revisable
choice of ends as the dignity of autonomy [citation to Grun-
dlegung *434-35], in contrast to the heteronomous, lower-or-
der ends (pleasure, talent) among which the person may
choose. Kant thus expressed the fundamental liberal impera-
tive of moral neutrality with regard to the many disparate visions of
the good life: the concern embodied in the idea of human rights
is not with maximizing the agent's pursuit of any particular
lower-order ends, but rather with respecting the higher-order
capacity of the agent to exercise rational autonomy in choosing
and revising his ends, whatever they are.
25
With the neutrality principle which he announces in that passage, Rich-
ards links a principle tantamount to the harm principle:
Consistent with the autonomy-based interpretation of treating
persons as equals, the principles underlying ajust criminal law
require forms of action and forbearance from action that ex-
press, on terms fair to all, basic respect for the capacity of per-
sons responsibly to pursue their ends, whatever they are. Such
principles impose this constraint: only those forms of action
and forbearance that violate rights of the person to forms of
respect defined by the underlying principles of obligation and
duty may properly be criminalized.
26
In his initial discussion of autonomy, Richards does refer to the rele-
vance of "principles of conduct and canons of ethics to which [those
exercising autonomy] have given their rational assent," and of "the ca-
pacity to use normative principles, including, inter alia, principles of ra-
tional choice, to decide which among several ends may be most
22. D. Richards, Sex, Drugs, Death, and the Law 8 (1982).
23. But on the adjacent page, Richards describes the capacities (which he there
lists) as "capacities that constitute autonomy." Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see Richards,
Rights and Autonomy, 92 Ethics 3, 7 (1981).
24. Why Richards supposes that respect for the revisable choice of ends can intelligi-
bly be described as the dignity of something remains unelucidated by anything that Rich-
ards (or, of course, Kant) says.
25. D. Richards, supra note 22, at 9 (emphasis and footnotes added). In the version
of this paragraph in Rights and Autonomy, there is a citation for the "liberal imperative
of moral neutrality," to Dworkin, Liberalism, in Public and Private Morality 113-43 (S.
Hampshire ed. 1978). Richards, supra note 23, at 7.
26. D. Richards, supra note 22, at 17 (emphasis added).
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effectively and coherently realized." 27 But "effectiveness" and "coher-
ence" already sound rather different from Kant, and the differences
broaden and deepen as Richards discloses his own authorial under-
standing of the two not-unambiguous paragraphs which I have just
quoted from him. For his working interpretation of Kant's conception
of autonomy soon drops all reference to norms of choice:
In [Kant's] central statements of ethical theory, moral person-
ality is decribed in terms of autonomous independence-the
capacity to order and choose one's ends as a free and rational
being.28
S. . T]he autonomy-based concept of treating persons as
equals rests on respect for the individual's ability to deter-
mine, evaluate, and revise the meaning of his or her own life.29
The focal weight ... give[n] to the freedom and rationality of
the individual as the creator of his own life is the ideal funda-
mental to the autonomy-based interpretation of treating per-
sons as equals, the basis of the human rights perspective in
politics and law.3°
The "fundamental right" which Richards derives from these considera-
tions is the right of persons "to determine the meaning of their own
lives."-3
It is hard to find a more inexact rendering of Kant's conceptions of
autonomy, rationality, dignity, and the kingdom of ends.
We might begin with the "memorable phrase" which introduces
Kant as sponsor of Sex, Drugs, Death and the Law: "free and rational
sovereigns in the kingdom of ends." The phrase does not, of course,
occur in Kant, either at the pages from which Richards claims to have
memorized it, or anywhere else. For on the pages to which Richards
refers us, Kant states not only that the kingdom of ends is "certainly
only an ideal," but also, and more importantly, that even a rational leg-
islator in a kingdom of ends would not be sovereign unless he were "a
completely independent being, without needs and with an unlimited
power adequate to his will" 32-a godlike, not a human being. As if
already vexed by Richards' misreading, Kant wrote a few years later, in
the Critique of Practical Reason:
We are indeed legislative members of a moral realm which is
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id. at 109. Identical statement, id. at 177.
29. Id. at 172.
30. Id. at 274 (emphasis in original). Richards ascribes this view to "the Pico [Della
Mirandola]-Sartre tradition," but refers back also to Kant as one of the greatest philoso-
phers of human rights and an upholder (though with tensions and inconsistencies in
practice) of "the moral ideal of autonomy." Id.
31. Id.
32. I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals *433-34 (Grundlegung) (H.
Paton trans. 1956) [hereinafter Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals].
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possible through freedom and which is presented to us as an
object of respect by practical reason; yet we are at the same
time subjects in it, not sovereigns, and to mistake our inferior posi-
tion as creatures and to deny, from self-conceit, respect to the
holy law is, in spirit, a defection from it [the moral law] even if
its letter be fulfilled.33
But already in the Grundlegung, on the two pages following those cited
by Richards, Kant had made pellucidly clear how different from
Richards' is his understanding of the "dignity of autonomy." What has
"intrinsic worth [Werth], i.e., dignity [Wuerde]" has only the worth "de-
termined for it by the [moral] law."'34 "Therefore morality, and hu-
manity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has
dignity."35 The capacities mentioned by Richards (some of which are
here specifically mentioned by Kant)3 6 have a "market value [Markt-
preis]" and/or an "affective [or: fancy] price [Affectionspreis]" (another
merely relative value), but morally upright actions (such as fidelity in
promises and benevolence on principle) have intrinsic "worth [Wu-
erde]." Morally good dispositions can lay claim to dignity, just because
they and only they afford to rational creatures participation in giving
universal laws and thusfit such creatures to be members and legislators
in a possible kingdom of ends. The maxims of rational choosers (i.e.,
their rationales for their choices) have dignity only when those maxims
could harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends, by treating not only
other persons but also each of the choosers themselves (i.e., their own
rational nature) as no mere means but also an end. "Autonomy is there-
fore the ground of the dignity [Wuerde] of human nature and of every
rational nature."37
In short, one has autonomy just in so far as one does in fact make
one's choices, not on the basis of one's interests, but out of respect for
the demands of morality.3 8 And: "[A]ll claims of self-esteem which
33. I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, *82-83 (L. Beck trans. 1976) [hereinafter
Critique of Practical Reason] (emphasis added).
34. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *435-36. Contrast
Richards, supra note 22, at 20 ("the only thing Kant claimed to be of unconditional
worth, personal dignity" (citing Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at
*434-35)).
35. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *435.
36. These capacities, just as such, Kant in fact regards as talents, which fit one to
pursue "any kind of ends" (cf. Richards' references to one's ends "whatever they are"),
and which at best are worthy only of a respect which is no more than analogous to the
respect due to the worth of the moral law and choice in conformity with that law. Cri-
tique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *41, *77-78; cf. infra note 88.
37. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *436 (emphasis added).
On Kant's attribution of dignity to (i) humanity, (ii) rational nature, (iii) morality, (iv)
persons, (v) those who conform to duty, and (vi) dispositions to do one's duty for duty's
sake, see Hill, Humanity as an End in Itself, 91 Ethics 84, 91-92 (1980).
38. See Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *433, where "au-
tonomy" is first introduced. Consider also Kant's concept of the state's autonomy as its
formation and maintenance of itself "in accordance with the laws of freedom [nach
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precede conformity to the moral law are null and void. For the cer-
tainty of a disposition which agrees with this law is the first condition of
any worth [Werth] of the person .... and any presumption [to worth] prior
to this is false .... ,,39
It might, indeed, have been better to begin these summary com-
ments on Richards where Kant begins his ethical teaching-with the
concept of intrinsic human worth (Wuerde). We can overhear him in his
lectures of 1780-81:
The supreme created good is the most perfect world, that is, a
world in which all rational beings are happy and are worthy of
happiness. The ancients realized that mere happiness could not
be the one highest good. For if all men were to obtain this
happiness without distinction of just and unjust, the highest
good would not be realized, because though happiness would
indeed exist, worthiness of it would not.... Man can hope of
being happy only in so far as he makes himself worthy to be
happy, for this is the condition of happiness which reason it-
self proposes. 40
Or we can look at the opening gambit in the Moral Catechism which
Kant proposed in his most mature published reflections on ethics-the
decisive first move by which teachers are to dislodge pupils from their
exclusive concern with happiness. Supposing you had power to dis-
pense happiness at no cost to yourself:
[W]ould you see to it that the drunkard is never short of wine
and whatever else he needs to get drunk?...
No, I would not.
You see, then, that if you had all happiness in your hands
and, along with it, the best will, you still would. . . first try to
find out to what extent each [person] is worthy [wuerdig] of
happiness.4 1
Kant admonishes teachers to exalt "above everything else in actions"
the "dignity [Wuerde]" of virtue. For otherwise the concept of duty dis-
solves and "man's consciousness of his own nobility then disappears
Freiheitsgesetzenl." Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 3, at *318. Richards is
aware that Kant's conception of autonomy has something (to say the least) to do with
acting from moral duty. See Richards, supra note 23, at 15. But Richards persists in his
reductive presentation; autonomy, he says, is a matter of the "separateness of persons."
Id.
39. Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *73 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 147.
40. I. Kant, The Ethical Systems of the Ancients, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note
1, at 6 (emphasis added); see also I. Kant, The Ultimate Destiny of the Human Race, in
id. at 252 (recorded in the concluding moments of the lectures); Critique of Practical
Reason, supra note 33, at *110 ("[V]irtue (as the worthiness [Wuerdigheit] to be happy) is
the supreme condition of whatever appears to us to be desirable and thus of all our
pursuit of happiness and, consequently .... is the supreme good.").
41. I. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue *480 (M. Gregor trans. 1964) [hereinafter The
Doctrine of Virtue] (emphasis in original).
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and he is for sale and can be bought for a price [Preis] that the seductive
inclinations offer him." 42
Richards is in another world. He thinks, for example, that Kantian
autonomy involves "sovereignty over the qualities of one's experi-
ence." 43 Many young heroin users in the United States enjoy such sov-
ereignty, he says, by choosing to allow their drug use a "psychological
centrality" which "may, from the perspective of their own circum-
stances, not unreasonably organize their lives and ends,"' 44 because
that use of heroin and the like "generates its own social tasks and stan-
dards of successful achievement, its own forms of status and respect,
and its own larger meaning centering on the perceived qualities that
the drug brings to the users' personal experiences, such as relief of anx-
iety and, sometimes, euphoric peace."' 45 Let us here ignore everything
Kant ever said about drunkards and the use of euphoric opiates (and
about any other particular question of duty to oneself). It remains
clear that Richards has nothing but equivocation, mere punning, upon
which to ground his claim that Kant's conception of autonomous freedom
inherently involves such choices as the choice to become "psychologi-
cally devoted" to heroin-to sell oneself, as Kant would say, to the se-
ductions of the inclinations (perhaps very seductive "from the
perspective of one's own circumstances"). And the point here is not
simply that such a choice entrains (pace Richards) enslavement, but
more importantly that such "determining and revising the meaning of
one's life" (afortiori choosing to find that "meaning" in "personal ex-
periences") 46 is utterly remote from Kant's autonomy; the rational
identification of, and respectful submission to, the moral law which, pre-
cisely as universal, imposes on each one of us duties to oneself.
47
42. Id. at *483.
43. D. Richards, supra note 22, at 177.
44. Id. at 176.
45. Id. at 175.
46. Cf. Richards, supra note 23, at 16 ("Kantian principles can be shown to justify a
fundamental right to autonomy in deciding whom and how to love in order to preserve
underlying values of personal emotional integrity and self-expression in intimate relations." (em-
phasis added)). Equally distant from Kant is the concern with "self-definition" (by
choices of, e.g., "the form and nature of... intensely personal bonds"-involving, e.g.,
homosexual sodomy) which is foundational to the dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. 2841, 2851-52 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. R. Wolff, The Autonomy of Reason 178 (1973) [hereinafter R. Wolff, The Au-
tonomy of Reason], frankly concedes that in talking of autonomy, "Kant turns out not to
be saying what I [Wolff] want him to say." For Wolff, autonomy means that rational
agents are bound to substantive policies and principles because and only because they
have freely chosen them; "the substance or content of moral principles derives from
collective commitments to freely chosen ends." Id. at 181. But as Wolff rightly stresses,
this belief is "incompatible" with the belief "that there are objective, substantive, cate-
gorical moral principles which all rational agents, insofar as they are rational, acknowl-
edge and obey," id.-and the latter is a belief which Kant certainly held, and wished to
explain by the notion of"disinterestedness" central to what he called autonomy. Id. at 179.
Autonomy Wolff-style (or, similarly, Richards-style) has "the most far-reaching conse-
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But what about Kant's conception of freedom? I shall have more
to say about Kantian freedoms in the next section. But I should say
something about the conception of freedom that is, for Kant, the con-
ception relevant to, and on the same plane as, his ethical conception of
autonomy. The main thing to be said is that this freedom-freedom in
the strictest sense-is known only through our consciousness of the
moral law. 4s And "the human will by virtue of its freedom is directly
determined by the moral law"; 49 man "is the subject of the moral law
which is holy, because of the autonomy of his freedom." 50 To be con-
scious of freedom indeed precisely is to be conscious of the moral
law. 51 If the will is not determined by the moral law, it is not free, for it
is determined either by that law or by inclinations 52-but to be deter-
mined by inclinations is precisely to be subject to heteronomy, i.e., to
lack autonomy.53 Thus "the autonomy of the will is the sole principle"-
not merely the presupposition-"of all moral laws and of the duties
conforming to them." 54
But, of course, individuals are conscious of their own freedom not
only through their awareness of being able to resist the seduction of the
inclinations, but also through their experience of being able to reject
the categorical imperatives of morality. In a strategic paragraph of his
lectures on ethics, Kant holds before his hearers the double significance
of freedom. First, freedom is "the inner value of the world." For:
"The inherent value of the world, the summum bonum, is freedom in ac-
cordance with a will which is not necessitated to action." 55 "But on the
quences for politics as well as for ethics," id. at 178-for example, anarchism, as he
defends it in R. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (1970)-but autonomy of this sort is
simply "not at all what Kant had in mind." R. Wolff, The Autonomy of Reason, supra, at
178. Wolff finds it "unsettling" that Kant thus uses the word "autonomy." Id. at 179.
But his explanation of Kant's meaning seems to set aside what is perhaps the key: that
one's will is autonomous or self-legislative just insofar as nothing determines it save
one's conception of the will's (i.e., practical reason's) own worth. See W.Jones, Morality
and Freedom in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant 102-12 (1940). However, in
stressing that Kant's concept of giving law to oneself has nothing to do with Richards'
concept of "meaning giving," I do not wish to suggest that Kant's conception of self-
legislation is any more coherent than his conception of the self. See, e.g., K. Ward, The
Development of Kant's View of Ethics 166-74 (1972).
48. Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *29, *30, *31, *47, *70; see
Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *225, *226.
49. Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *38.
50. Id. at *87.
51. See id. at *46; Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *447
("[A] free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same."); id. at *450; cf.
Duties to Oneself, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note 1, at 29 ("The more he can be
morally compelled, the freer a man is.").
52. See Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *72.
53. See Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *433.
54. Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *33; see id. at *39; Groundwork
of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *452-53.
55. Duties to Oneself, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note 1, at 122.
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other hand," he goes on,
freedom unrestrained by rules of its conditional employment
is the most terrible of all things .... If the freedom of man
were not kept within bounds by objective rules, the result
would be the completest savage disorder. There could then
be no certainty that man might not use his powers to destroy
himself, his fellows, and the whole of nature. 56
Sophisticates may smile at Kant's references here and elsewhere 57 to
savage disorder, wild lawless freedom, and so forth. Anarchy, one may
feel, belongs to the past, or to other peoples. But Kant is here58 think-
ing on principle, not primarily predictively or prudentially, 59 let alone
pictorially. His "savage disorder" can be exemplified not only by the
eighties gay-bar/bathhouse, in which lust courts even homicide and
self-destruction, but also by the coolly unprincipled national choice to
treat North Atlantic democracy as exempt from the moral law against
murder by preparations and readiness to carry out a vast holocaust of
innocents (and even of "the whole of nature") in the face of defeat. 60
At all events, Kant's precise purpose in holding before his students
the Janus faces of freedom was, by inducing in them a sense of free-
dom's grandeur and facility for degradation, to persuade them of the
(moral) necessity of respecting humanity (rationality, the source of all
worth) in oneself, as the precondition for respecting it in the person of
others. In that very paragraph he proceeds to identify and condemn
certain "victimless" or "self-regarding" moral evils which excite
56. Id.; see id. at 123, 125, 151.
57. See, e.g., Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *316.
58. Of course, there is elsewhere a strain of inadequately grounded progressivism
(taking hope for destiny) in Kant's view of the future course of history. See, e.g., I. Kant,
Idea for a Universal History, in Kant on History 21 (L. Beck ed. 1975) [hereinafter Idea
for a Universal History].
59. Kant carefully denies that in pointing to the abyss of lawless freedom he is ad-
vancing a prudential (or, as we would now say, a consequentialist) argument. Duties to
Oneself, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note 1, at 125.
60. SeeJ. Finnis, J. Boyle & G. Grisez, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism
(1987). Richards, at text accompanying note 49 of his comment to this Paper, says the
text sentence is my "picture of homosexuality"-a claim false to the text and to my
discussion of choices to engage in homosexual acts in the "esoteric" writings which,
oddly enough, I freely cite, where relevant, in my "exoteric" works. The rest of Rich-
ards' agitated response to the text sentence fails to attend to the only fact I there as-
serted, viz. the fact witnessed to by, among others, Denis Altman (an Australian
university teacher and well-known pro-homosexual writer), in his AIDS and the New
Puritanism 155 (1986) ("My own observations during the course of writing this book
suggested that while quite major shifts in behavior have taken place, surprising numbers
of people continue to use the baths in the same way as before the epidemic.") (published
in the United States as AIDS in the Mind of America). I have to add that Richards, at
note 53 of his comment, is as inaccurate as his other interpretations, when he asserts
that, in the article there cited, I stated that homosexual acts are only "usually" wrong; in
fact I said that they are only usuallypromiscuous, but on a moral analysis are always objec-
tively wrong, like other essentially masturbatory sexual acts. For the reasoning, partly
burlesqued and mostly ignored by Richards, see the article.
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Richards' broadly approving concern: drug use, sodomy, and suicide.
And the same paragraph states the principle of Kant's condemnation:
The supreme rule is that in all actions which affect himself a
man should so conduct himself that every exercise of his
power[s] is compatible with the fullest employment of
them.... The conditions under which alone the fullest use of
freedom is possible, and can be in harmony with itself, are the
essential ends of humanity. It must conform with these. The
principle of all duties is that the use of freedom must be in
keeping with the essential ends of humanity.6 1
And "[o]ur duties towards ourselves constitute the supreme condition
and the principle of all morality; for moral worth is the worth of the
person as such .... -"62 If one thought oneselfjustified in treating one-
self as a mere means, what reason would one have not to consider one-
self justified in treating other persons likewise?
IV.
It is time to consider more directly whether Kant thought that his
ethical and political or legal theory required or was consistent with the
"harm principle" which I identified and labelled in Part I. For besides
the freedom with which Part III was concerned, there is, of course, an-
other freedom: the political or natural-law liberty which Kant calls
outer or external freedom. And: "Freedom (independence from the
constraint of another's will), insofar as it is compatible with the free-
dom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law [nach einem
allgemeinen Gesetz], is the one sole and original right that belongs to
every human being by virtue of his humanity."'6 3 Like the passages
from Kant which I quoted in Part I, this may seem to confirm that Kant
thought it wrong for the law of a state to hinder one's violation of one's
moral duties to oneself. That Kant did indeed thus subscribe to the
harm principle is maintained by good commentators, such as Mary
Gregor:
61. Duties to Oneself, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note 1, at 123-24. He expresses
the same principle in the words used in his later moral writings: "actions must be in
keeping with humanity itself." Id. at 125; see id. at 121.
62. Id. at 121. Having reached the end of this Part, readers will note that of the 45
passages from Kant which are cited in it against Richards' interpretation of Kant's con-
ception of autonomy, only one involves Kant's "casuistry," i.e., his views on sex, drugs,
killing, the harm principle, etc. For the whole section is concerned with his fundamental
"philosophical vision," a vision in which it is simply false to say that moral reasonable-
ness constrains only "interpersonal conduct" (as Richards continues to claim in, for ex-
ample, his reply at text accompanying note 22 of his comment). Richards' main defense
against my critique-viz, his assertion that my "interpretive approach puts a fundamen-
tal weight on Kant's casuistry" (etc., etc.)-will be found surprising not only by readers
of this Part but also any who read Part IV, in which I do say something about Kant's
casuistry, in its place. Whether Richards himself adheres to his sensible principles of
interpretation when he turns to my own works, readers will easily judge.
63. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *237.
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Law [Recht] has to do only with the relations of one person to
another in so far as their actions, as physical events in time,
can have an influx on one another. By this Kant excludes from
the scope of Law all actions which affect only oneself, even
though it is conceivable that some of these actions could be
prevented by outer [e.g. state] legislation. Certain actions af-
fecting only oneself are morally impossible, but the ground of
their impossibility lies in man's obligation to moral integrity
and virtue; and since virtue, as an interior attitude of will, lies
beyond the scope of outer legislation, juridical laws ought not
to prohibit actions of this sort. Though such violations of duty
to oneself may involve external actions, juridical laws ought
not to prohibit these actions except in so far as they might, at
the same time, have injurious effects on other people.64
I challenge this interpretation. (I have no a priori interest in claiming
Kant as a supporter of my own view that neither the harm principle nor,
afortiori, the neutrality principle are entitled to a place in a sound gen-
eral political philosophy. For Kant's ethical theory, and therefore his
political theory too, seem to me deeply inadequate. So it would be no
embarrassment to me if my challenge foundered and this conventional
interpretation were vindicated. Still, I think the interpretation errone-
ous, and shall say why.)
The most obvious difficulty which the interpretation faces is that
Kant displays no discomfort with criminal laws forbidding conduct
which seems "self-regarding," i.e., not harmful to others. In the sup-
plementary explanations he appended to the second edition of the
Rechtslehre, Kant discusses the proper measure of punishment required
by his principle of talion. His discussion touches on "crimes ... called
unnatural because they are committed against humanity itself": rape,
pederasty, and bestiality. 65 The list suggests Kant's lack of interest in
the harm principle; even if Paederastie be read (which it by no means
need be) as restricted to perverted sexual acts with a child, and even if
the child's consent is discounted and psychological and moral harm to
the child is conceded, there remains Kant's reference to bestiality, con-
duct which in itself affects no other person. The appropriate punish-
ment for bestiality, in Kant's view, is permanent expulsion from civil
society, since "the criminal guilty of bestiality is unworthy of remaining
in human society."6 6 All this the conventional interpretation would
64. M. Gregor, Laws of Freedom 35 (1963) (Gregor gives no citations at this point,
but seems to be commenting largely on Rechtslehre 229-30. See also, e.g., J. Murphy,
Kant: The Philosophy of Right 94 (1970); H. Reiss, Kant's Political Writings 22 (1970);
Fletcher, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, 22 U.W. Ontario L. Rev. 171, 175
(1984).
65. Metaphysical Elements of Justice, supra note 3, at *363. One aspect of the
meaning of "against humanity itself" is shown by the phrase id. at *362-63 "the respect
due the humanity in the person of the miscreant (that is, due the human species)"; cf.
infra note 68.
66. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *366. The next sentence in
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have to explain away as some sort of slip, or mere gross inconsistency
(and hands might be waved in the direction of Kant's "pietistic up-
bringing," and so forth).
Almost equally obvious, and perhaps more telling, is the account
ofjuridical duties to oneself, an account which Kant gives eight or nine
pages after the passages in the Rechtslehre which are principally relied
upon by the conventional interpretation. In the earlier passages, as will
be recalled from section I above, Kant had stated:
[The concept of Recht] applies only to the external and-what
is more-practical relationship of one person to another in
which their actions can in fact exert an influence on each other
(directly or indirectly) .... Recht is therefore the aggregate of
those conditions under which the will of one person can be
conjoined with the will of another in accordance with a univer-
sal law of freedom. 67
I have been quoting from pages *230 and *237 of the Rechtslehre. On
pages *239-40, however, Kant states bluntly that all duties are either
juridical duties (Rechtspflichten) or duties of virtue [Tugendpflichten]; that
for juridical duties, but not for duties of virtue, external legislation is
possible; and that perfect juridical duties are of two classes: duties to
others, corresponding to "the right of mankind [Menschen] in others,"
and duties to oneself, corresponding to "the right of humanity [Menschheit]
in our own person."'68
Gregor has argued that Kant operates with two completely differ-
ent conceptions of "juridical duty," one treating duties as juridical
(rather than ethical) according to the type of legislation and/or con-
straint (in particular, external penalty) accompanying the law creating
them, and the other treating duties as juridical (rather than ethical) ac-
cording as they relate to actions themselves (rather than merely to the
maxims of actions). She is thus enabled to maintain that while juridical
my text predicted the sort of response which, in the event, Richards has made.
67. Id. at *230.
68. Id. at *239-40. This distinction between the right of Menschheit in one's own
person and the right of Menschen in the person of others is one of the reasons why I am
unpersuaded by Fletcher's view that "the Kantian ideal is clearly communitarian, for our
focus is not on our own selves, but on the vindication of the dignity of all human
kind.... [S]olidarity [for Kant] is more important than the fulfillment of the private
self." Fletcher, supra note 64, at 176, 177. As to the point made in my text, which is
fundamental to my interpretation of Kant's views on legal enforcement of duties to (hu-
manity in) oneself, I may record that in the "close parsing" to which note 14 of
Richards' comment appeals for support, Douglas Dryer felt obliged to declare that the
table in Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at 240 is false to Kant's "mature
view" (published virtually simultaneously) not just in one but in two respects. He also
asserted that the correct translation of "Rechtspflichten" is one not hitherto adopted in
any of the published English translations ("duties for which there are correlative
rights"). I do not say he was mistaken, though I find the proposed translation surpris-
ing. Anyway, Dryer's strong measures with Kant's text were of a piece with his willing-
ness to junk Kant's still more mature statements about bestiality (and, probably,
pederasty). Id. at *363.
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duties in the first sense must relate to other men, juridical duties in the
second sense can relate to uses of one's own person.69 Thus she seeks
to preserve her view that Kant restricted the proper field of state law to
actions affecting others, and thus upheld something approximating the
harm principle.
I think her attempt fails. All on the same two pages of the
Rechtslehre to which I have referred, Kant lays it down explicitly that
juridical duties may be enforced by external legislation and that juridi-
cal duties include duties to oneself (as distinct from duties to others). It
is not credible that he has here passed from one sense of "juridical" to
another quite different sense, without seeking to relate the one to the
other, and quite unconscious of the confusion such a transition would
create.
Moreover, Kant in fact takes care, then and there, to explain why
duties which are not juridical but merely ethical are not proper subjects
of external legislation. And his explanation has nothing to do with the
right to freedom (still less with Richards' "autonomy" or Justice
Brandeis' "right to be let alone"70). It is simply that the subject-matter
of ethical duties is an internal act of the mind-as he says elsewhere,
"intentions and not actions only" 7 1 -that no external legislation can
bring about.7 2 (He adds, however, that external legislation can com-
mand actions which would be conducive to that internal virtue and its
end.73) Thus Kant incorporates Gregor's proposed "different point of
view" (her second sense of "juridical duty") 74 within his explanation of
juridical duty in her first sense, and then moves promptly and smoothly
to his flat denial that juridical duties must be duties to others.
Here, then, we have Kant's explicit theoretical framework for af-
firming the propriety, in principle, of external (e.g., state) laws pro-
scribing and penalizing pederasty and bestiality (to go no further than
Kant's own later examples).
But what are we to make of the passages which I quoted in Part I
and have amplified in the last paragraph but one?
Observe, first, that in the many passages of the Rechtslehre which
speak of one's will, freedom, action, or condition coexisting with the will,
etc., of others, Kant always adds a further necessary condition: that the
coexistence, consistency or compatibility of wills, etc., be "in accord-
69. M. Gregor, supra note 64, at 115-16.
70. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2848 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(statute prohibiting sodomy interferes with civilized man's "right to be let alone").
71. Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *71.
72. See Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *239.
73. Id.; see infi-a notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
74. Which is indeed one sense in which Kant speaks of juridical (as opposed to
ethical) duty: see the section title in his The Doctrine of Virtue: "Ethics does not give
laws for Actions (lus does that) but only for the Maxims of actions." The Doctrine of
Virtue, supra note 41, at *388.
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ance with a universal law." 75  Our contemporary neo-Kantians
standardly omit this condition (as Kant himself had omitted it fifteen
years earlier, in the Critique of Pure Reason, with a glancing and rhetorical
reference to a constitution "of the greatest human freedom"). Other
interpreters, e.g., Fletcher, do not overlook it, but read it down as re-
quiring merely that the choices be compatible "as these choices are uni-
versalized across the legal system as a whole." 76 I suggest, however,
that the phrase "in accordance with a universal law" was certainly
meant to import Kant's own conception expounded in the three princi-
pal forms or formulations of the categorical imperative-(i) universal-
izability of form, (ii) respect of humanity as an end in itself, (iii)
harmonization of individual maxims within a kingdom of ends-"fun-
damentally only so many formulas of the very same law." 77
Now, as Kant indicated in the Grundlegung, a genuine universal law
contains the ground not only of duties to others but also of duties to
oneself.78 Hence, in insisting that, to be right, one's will must not only
be compatible with others' wills but must be "in accordance with a uni-
versal law," Kant was indicating why certain acts and choices, fully com-
patible with the wills of others, are nonetheless violations of perfect
juridical duties to oneself-duties which, being juridical, can in princi-
ple be legally enforced. As he says a little further on in the Rechtslehre,
recalling the Grundlegung's second formulation of the categorical imper-
ative, one has a juridical duty "[t]o assert[] one's own worth as a human
being in relation to others, and this duty is expressed in the proposi-
tion: 'Do not make yourself into a mere means for others, but be at the
same time an end for them.' -79 (Here one can recall Kant's view that
the essence of the "carnal crimes against nature," and of sexual promis-
cuity in general, is that human beings do thereby make themselves
mere objects of enjoyment for someone's sexual desire. Such conduct,
even if it can coexist with the conduct of others, thus cannot do so "in
accordance with a universal law."80)
What, then, of the passage in which Kant states that the concept of
Recht applies only to the external relationship of one person to another,
75. Notably Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *230-31. The syn-
tax is ambiguous, and it may well be right to prefer Abbott's translation: "Act externally
so that the free use of thy elective will may not interfere with the freedom of any man so
far as it agrees with universal law." Kant's Theory of Ethics, 231 (T. Abbott trans. 1883)
(emphasis added).
76. Fletcher, supra note 64, at 175.
77. Groundwork of Metaphysic of Morals, supra note 32, at *436; see id. at *421.
78. Id. at *430.
79. The Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *236. Kant adds: "This
duty will be explained later as an obligation resulting from the right of humanity in our
own person (lexjust)." Id.
80. Duties to Oneself, supra note 1, at 124; I. Kant, Duties Towards the Body in
Respect of Sexual Impulse, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note 1, at 163-66; I. Kant,
Crimina Carnis, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note I, at 170; The Metaphysical Elements
ofJustice, supra note 3, at *278.
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in so far as the action of one person can directly or indirectly affect the
other? I will say nothing here about the extent to which Kant's refer-
ence to indirect effects might erode the harm principle. Rather, I shall
simply recall that Kant's whole treatment of the question "What is
Recht?" remains within the conventional framework of Western
thought, a framework which he here recalls by his use of the Latin, quid
sit iuris, and his use of justum and injustum to translate Recht and Un-
recht.81 In that traditional framework, justice and right are conceptually
tied to relationships of one person to (an)other(s).8 2 Thomas Aquinas,
for example, would have no difficulty in saying that an act of recrea-
tional use of heroin (or consensual homosexual intercourse) is not, or
not necessarily, an act of injustice or a violation of anyone else's right.
But he and the tradition would add that it does not follow that theprohi-
bition of such acts is an act of injustice or a violation of right. Nor does
such an act of prohibition fall outside Kant's conception of the sphere
of Recht; it precisely satisfies the criterion of that conception: an act
which applies to the "external and . . . practical relationship of one
person [here: the lawgiver or the sovereign] to another" in which the
action of the former can exert an influence on the actions of the
latter.83
In the last analysis, the conceptual framework articulated in Kant's
paragraph on the concept of Recht does not seem in any way intended
to settle disputed questions about the proper range of state law. At the
very least, it offers no normative premises for a normative conclusion
such as the harm principle.
There remains only the passage which I put at the head of this
Paper: "My duty towards myself cannot be treated juridically; the law
touches only our relations with other men . . . ." It is a passage from
the students' transcription of Kant's lectures of 1780-81, and as such it
cannot stand against the clear statements, both general and particular,
in the long-gestated Rechtslehre.84 Moreover, there is a sense in which
the passage remains true, even if one rejects the harm principle and
concedes the propriety of punishing bestiality. The duty to treat one-
self as an end, as honorable, and not as a mere means to gratifying
81. The Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *229-30.
82. SeeJ. Finnis, supra note 19, at 161-63. As Kant says elsewhere: "towards one-
self one can never do an injustice [unrecht]." 1. Kant, On the Common Saying: "This
May be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice," in Kant's Political Writings
294-95 (H. Reiss ed. 1970).
83. Metaphysical Elements ofJustice, supra note 3, at *230. Recall, too, that such
prohibited or prohibitable actions, being in Kant's view incapable of being willed as
universal law, violate the categorical imperative and are thus illicit and not the matter of
"moral right as a warrant or title of action [Befugniss] (facultas moralis)." Id. at *222,
*223-24.
84. Similarly, in I. Kant, De Littera Legis, in Lectures on Ethics, supra note 1, at 48,
Kant is seen distinguishing the ethical from the legal by a series of indicia, by no means
all of which are maintained in the Rechtsehre.
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one's own or others' inclinations, is a duty which can only be truly and
fully fulfilled by maintaining a certain intention/disposition (Gesin-
nung)-and there is a sense in which the state's law, as such, indeed
cannot reach or "treat" dispositions. All that the law can do directly is
authorize one man (the executive sovereign, Kant would say) to inter-
fere with the actions of another, e.g., the pederast.
V.
But why interfere with those actions? Kant's claim-a matter of
ethics-that such actions are immoral ("violations of duties to one-
self") is inadequately argued. And he fails to offer any significant argu-
mentation for his evident view-a matter of political theory-that the
state can rightly punish such violations of duties to oneself, even when
they violate no duty to others. I must say something about the roots of
Kant's failure to supply the argumentation required for this theorem of
his political theory. But I shall here say little or nothing about the just-
mentioned deficiency in his ethical theory,85 though my discussion of
the weaknesses of Kant's political theory will hint at how I think his
ethical theory might be enriched in ways that would allow the immoral-
ity of (i.e., the unreasonableness and self-mutilation inherent in) human
actions of these types to be articulated and clarified.
The political-philosophical principle which Kant needs, and virtu-
ally lacks, is the principle that the point and justification of state law is
the common good. As L.T. Hobhouse put it in his classic exposition of
liberalism:
The common good includes the good of every member of the
community, and the injury which a man inflicts upon himself is
matter of common concern, even apart from any ulterior effect
upon others. If we refrain from coercing a man for his own
good, it is not because his good is indifferent to us, but be-
cause it cannot be furthered by coercion.8 6
85. But see Finnis, Personal Integrity, Sexual Morality and Responsible
Parenthood, Anthropos: Rivista di Studi sulla Persona e ]a Famiglia, no. 1, 1985, at
43-55. On the weaknesses of Kant's ethical theory, see J. Finnis, supra note 21, at
122-24. On the extent of the parallelism with a better moral theory, see J. Finnis, J.
Boyle & G. Grisez, supra note 60, at ch. 10; G. Grisez, Christian Moral Principles
108-09 (1984); Boyle, Aquinas, Kant, and Donagan on Moral Principles, 58 New Scho-
lasticism 391-408 (1984). In distinguishing ethical from political theory as I do in the
text, I take for granted, with Kant and almost everybody, that "the claims of ethics" can
and should be distinguished from "the [legally, coercively] enforceable claims of eth-
ics"-as Richards' reply, at text accompanying notes 25-37 in his comment, manifestly
fails to do.
86. L. Hobhouse, Liberalism 76 (1964) [1911]. Thus Hobhouse rejects Mill's dis-
tinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts (and the principle Mill sought
to found on it): "first because there are no actions which may not directly or indirectly
affect others, secondly because even if there were they would not cease to be matter of
concern to others." Id. But he goes on to argue, in rather Kantian fashion, that "[t]o try
to form character by coercion is to destroy it in the making," or (weaker version) "it is
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So far as I know, Kant's own publications scarcely discuss, in a political
context, the question of fact which Hobhouse thus raises: can the good
of a human person be advanced by coercion?8 7 In an ethical context,
Kant does advance a very weak argument against making the perfection
of (an)other(s) one's responsibility. The happiness of others is among
one's fundamental responsibilities, but not their perfection, for:
it is contradictory to say that I make another person's perfection
my end and consider myself obligated to promote this. For
the perfection of another man, as a person, consists precisely
in his own power to adopt his end in accordance with his own
concept of duty; and it is self-contradictory to demand that I
do (make it my duty to do) what only the other person himself
can do.88
This will not do. We can agree that the necessary condition of human
perfection is indeed authenticity: that one has adopted one's commit-
ments in accordance with one's own conception of duty. But I deny
that education, coercive deterrence, and coercive denial of opportuni-
ties can do nothing to assist persons to avoid choices which will de-
grade or in some other way harm them. And in several of his
unpublished reflections, as we shall see, Kant admits that coercive
measures can indeed be efficacious for this purpose.
It is important, at this point, to make a distinction. Coercing peo-
ple to adopt or profess a religion is-if attempted for religious mo-
tives-self-stultifying in a way which could merit Kant's protean word
"(self-)contradictory." For the good of adherence to the propositions
of religious faith intrinsically involves that the propositions be adhered
to as true, i.e., as disclosing a transcendent reality which is afit object of
adoration, petitionary prayer, and so forth. To the extent that the pro-
positions are professed because their profession is convenient, both
they and the professing of them obscure rather than disclose that
reality.
But there is nothing analogously self-stultifying in coercing people
to abstain from drug-taking or pederasty, whether by threatening them
with criminal penalties, or by threatening those who would supply them
with opportunities for indulgence in the vice, or merely by threatening
not possible to compel morality because morality is the act or character of a free agent."
Id. He admits exceptions:
[I]n the case of the drunkard-and I think the argument applies to all cases
where overwhelming impulse is apt to master the will-it is a[n] ... elementary
duty to remove the sources of temptation, and to treat as anti-social in the high-
est degree every attempt to make profit out of human weakness, misery, and
wrong-doing.
Id. at 81.
87. Unless one counts the statement noted supra note 73 and accompanying text.
88. The Doctrine of Virtue, supra note 41, at *385 (emphasis in original). There is
no need to dwell here on the fact that Kant's conception of perfection is here, in Rawl-
sian terminology, a "thin theory." See supra note 36.
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those who would corrupt them while young. Nor has it been demon-
strated that this need render the persons coerced unfit to integrate
their characters around other personal commitments, freely chosen by
them from the vast range of diverse but upright forms of life.89
Nor indeed has it been demonstrated that Western tradition was
mistaken in holding, with Aristotle and Aquinas, that people who are
prone to vice, and resistant to verbal persuasion, not only can be re-
strained by coercive threats from depraved actions but also can often
be led-by an acculturation which those philosophers called habitua-
tion-to make, willingly (i.e., by their own authenticfree choice), the very
types of choices (to abstain from vice and to pursue worthwhile com-
mitments) which, earlier, they made only "under coercion" and
unwillingly. 90
And it is clear that Kant shared the factual judgment made by the
tradition: "Man must be trained, so as to become domesticated and
become virtuous later on. The coercion of government
[Regirungszwang] and education make him supple, flexible and obedient
to the laws; then reason will rule." 91 But Kant could not bring this
factual premise into conjunction with a normative premise about the
common good.
For a workable conception of the common good requires that we
reject several of the notorious Kantian dualisms. There is first the dual-
ism of the phenomenal world (including human persons) subject to the
reign of natural determinism and impulse versus the noumenal realm of
"selves" or "subjects," of free will and moral law. The second dualism
89. As Joseph Raz says (using "autonomy" not in the Kantian sense but in a normal
modem sense rather like that which Richards had in mind): "[O]nly very rarely will the
non-availability of morally repugnant options reduce a person's choice sufficiently to
affect his autonomy.... The ideal of autonomy requires only the availability of morally
acceptable options." J. Raz, supra note 12, at 381; see also id. at 412, 417. However,
Raz contends, with notable abruptness, that coercive interference does violate autonomy
because (i) it expresses an attitude of disrespect for the coerced individual, and (ii) its
interference is "global and indiscriminate." Id. at 418. These grounds seem fragile;
Raz's conception of the mechanisms of state coercion (and threats of coercion) is itself
global and indiscriminate. Contrast his more discriminating discussion in Raz, Liber-
alism, Autonomy, and the Politics of Neutral Concern, 7 Midwest Stud. in Phil. 89, 113
(1982). But his strictures may well apply to some of Kant's views about the extent of
punishment; permanent banishment, for example, seems too severe a penalty for homo-
sexual intercourse.
90. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics * 179b30-1180b28 (Bk. X: ch. 9); Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae, la-2ae, q. 95, a.1.
91. G. Kelly, Idealism, Politics and History 145 (1969), translating 15 I. Kant,
Gesammelte Schriften, *522-23 (Prussian Academy ed. 1923); see also id. at 170, trans-
lating, 19 I. Kant, Gesammelte Schriften 202 (Prussian Academy ed. 1934) ("Each man
is by nature bad and becomes good only to the extent that he is subject to a power that
obliges [noethigt] him to be good. But he has the capacity to become progressively better
without coercion [Zwang] if the dispositions for good within him are progressively devel-
oped."); Idea for a Universal History, supra note 58, at 23 (sixth thesis: man needs a
master).
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follows: of the human person's naturally determined impulse to happi-
ness, understood by Kant as a self-love 92 dominated by experienced sat-
isfaction with one's own condition (with the assurance that that
satisfaction will last)93 versus the rationally determined will to aperfection
consisting essentially only in conformity for duty's sake to a moral law
whose intelligibility is found not in the prospect of human fulfillment
for its own sake but simply in the universalizability of principles di-
recting choice. These dualisms block off Kant's view of all intelligible
intrinsic human goods other than the good of practical reasonableness
as such.
Kant rightly sees in practical reasonableness an intelligible worth
(intrinsic goodness) which cannot be exhaustively reduced to any deter-
minate state(s) of affairs which could be a technical objective. (Hence
his justified rejection of all forms of consequentialism.) But just as the
Critical philosophy inconsistently denies those forms of understanding of
reality which Kant admits in the particular case of understanding the
reality of the understanding and choosing subject (himself, oneself), 94
so too Kant inconsistently denies that we can understand aspects of
human personal flourishing (other than practical reasonableness itself)
as having an intelligible worth which cannot be exhaustively reduced to
determinate states of affairs or definite objectives, but which-as inex-
haustible prospects of human fulfillment-provide reasons for consider-
ing many possible determinate states of affairs to be choiceworthy
opportunities. 95 These basic aspects of human flourishing-basic
human goods-include not only practical reasonableness but also
human life itself (and its transmission), knowledge (and aesthetic ap-
preciation), excellence in performance (whether in "work" or "play"),
and the interpersonal harmony (involving both respect and favour)
which we call friendship or love in its various forms.96
Now in friendship-including concern for one's political commu-
nity-the friends envisage a truly common good which transcends both
self-love and mere altruism 9 7-and which also transcends Kant's dual-
92. See Critique of Practical Reason, supra note 33, at *22, *70, *73.
93. See The Doctrine of Virtue, supra note 41, at *386; see also I. Kant, Critique of
Judgement *434 n.1 (J. Meredith trans. 1973) ("enjoyment").
94. See the illuminating discussion in G. Grisez, Beyond the New Theism: A Phi-
losophy of Religion 152-80, 155-56 (1975) (discussing Critique of Pure Reason, supra
note 2, at *A546-7/B574-5).
95. SeeJ. Finnis, J. Boyle & G. Grisez, supra note 60, at ch. 10.
96. On basic human goods, seeJ. Finnis, supra note 19, at 81-99; on their intelligi-
bility, see J. Finnis, supra note 21, at 26-55. Not envisaging a multiplicity of basic as-
pects of human worth, Kant also did not steadily envisage the need for and possibility of
requirements of practical reasonableness other than the requirement of consistency
(universalizability) in choosing (which he eked out with a requirement of mastery over
the animal inclinations). On the multiple requirements of right choosing, see J. Finnis,
supra note 19, at 100-33; J. Finnis, supra note 21, at 66-79; J. Finnis, J. Boyle & G.
Grisez, supra note 60, at chs. 10-11.
97. On friendship and the idea of common good, see J. Finnis, supra note 19, at
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istic reduction of motives to the stark alternatives: self-love or sheer
duty; desire for sensuous satisfactions or bare respect for one's ration-
ality itself.
Given the more adequate concept of common good, there is no
reason (and certainly nothing in Kant or our neo-Kantians which gives
good grounds) to conclude that the justifying rationale of civil associa-
tion and law is anything other than the good of all those who, by their
cooperation, can reasonably hope to advance the common good of
their community. Favouring the good of one's fellow-citizens can
rightly involve the use of coercive measures, primarily to dissuade them
from morally evil forms of life, and secondarily to punish them, not for
violating "duties to themselves," but for willfully failing to cooperate in
the community's effort of reducing those evils and of maintaining forms
of life more conducive to authentic human flourishing.98
A paper on Kant and neo-Kantians is certainly not the place to of-
fer a full, and fully nuanced, justification and critique of laws proscrib-
ing and/or withholding juridical recognition and lawful status from
drug-use, sodomy, assistance in suicide, and so forth.9 9 I add just one
or two remarks.
Certainly there is room for much caution-not the a priori risk-
aversion of Rawls, but the sober Kantian reminder that, if man is an
animal who needs a master, the masters, too, are just such animals. 10 0
Masters are prone to do evil not merely out of self-love or malice, but
out of misguided zeal. And very common forms of misguided zeal in-
clude (i) mistaking the common good for some determinate end-state
to which present individual lives are treated as mere means, and (ii)
forgetting that the common good is instantiated in the good of each
and every individual, that no individual has a priori a claim to a fuller
share in the common good than any other individual, and that the indi-
vidual good includes some aspects of practical reasonableness which
Kant's dualism of sense versus reason led him to slide over: the inner
integrity by which senses and inclinations are not merely mastered by
but in partnership with reasonableness, and the outer authenticity by
which one's bodily and social behavior do not merely simulate an im-
posed or opportunistically convenient pattern but actually manifest
one's conscientious will.
141-44, 154-58, 210-18; on "altruism," see id. at 158.
98. Thus the West German Basic Law (1949), whose Kantian inspiration is often
mentioned by commentators, rightly provides in Art. II(1) that everyone has the right to
the free flourishing of his personality provided that he does not violate the rights of
others or the constitutional order "or the moral law [das Sittengesetz]." Thus the Basic
Law is more Kantian than neo-Kantian.
99. SeeJ. Finnis, supra note 19, at 221-23, 229-30; V. Haksar, Equality, Liberty,
and Perfectionism 236-57 (1979);J. Raz, supra note 12, at 390-95, 400-17. The latter
two books state strong reasons for rejecting the neutrality principle, and thus go far
towards undermining the harm principle.
100. See Idea for a Universal History, supra note 58, at 23.
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